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This study analyzes the interrelation between financial inclusion, the size of the shadow economy 
(SE) and the level of financial system stability on a panel sample of 20 emerging economic from 
2004-2014. Using on panel fixed effects Two-Stage Linear Regression (2SLS), we find that 
different levels of financial inclusion lead to different levels of financial stability, and the size of 
the SE can greatly influence this relationship. We use two models: one for assessing the SE-
inclusion tradeoff and the other for assessing the stability-inclusion tradeoff respectively. To 
measure inclusion and stability, we have computed two different indices using the same 
methodology employed by Sarma (2008). Our main findings show that financial inclusion has no 
significant effect on the size of the SE, however, both inclusion and SE can significantly increase 
the level of financial instability. Other variables were found to have a significant positive relation 
with SE like income inequality, age dependency ratio and credit to government and state-owned 
enterprises. While, income levels, unemployment, secondary school enrollment, and trade 
openness had a significant negative effect on the size of the SE. Regarding the impact on our 
computed index of financial instability and its determinants, concentration in the banking sector, 
competition in the banking sector, concentration in the banking sector, and financial openness were 
found to have a positive effect on the level of instability. Income levels were found to have mixed 
effects on the three measures of financial instability, while broad money to GDP (%); as a proxy 
for size of financial sector, bank overhead costs; as a proxy of banks’ inefficiency had significant 
negative effects on level of financial instability.  
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter I ....................................................................................................................................................... 3 
Chapter II ...................................................................................................................................................... 8 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT .................................................... 8 
2.1 Conceptualizing Financial Inclusion, SE and Financial Stability ................................................. 8 
2.2 Financial Inclusion and the Shadow Economy ........................................................................... 11 
2.2.1 Intermediation Costs ........................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.3 Social legitimacy ................................................................................................................. 12 
2.2.4 Socioeconomic variables ..................................................................................................... 13 
2.3 Factors Affecting Financial Stability .......................................................................................... 15 
2.3.1 Financial Inclusion ............................................................................................................. 15 
i. Diversification of deposit and loan bases ................................................................................ 16 
ii. Efficient allocation of Resources .............................................................................................. 17 
iii.    Monetary Policy Effectiveness ................................................................................................. 18 
iv.     Households financial Stability ................................................................................................. 21 
2.3.2 Banking Competition/Concentration .................................................................................. 23 
2.3.3 Quality of Regulations ........................................................................................................ 25 
2.3.4 Size of the Shadow Economy ............................................................................................... 25 
2.4 Empirical Literature and Hypothesis Development .................................................................... 26 
2.4.1 Financial Inclusion and the Size of the Shadow Economy.................................................. 27 
2.4.2 Financial Inclusion, Shadow Economy and Financial Stability ......................................... 28 
2.4.3 Banking Competition and Financial Stability ..................................................................... 31 
Chapter III ................................................................................................................................................... 33 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .................................................................................. 33 
3.1 Data Sources ............................................................................................................................... 33 
3.2 Measuring Financial Inclusion .................................................................................................... 36 
3.3 Measuring Financial Stability ..................................................................................................... 37 
3.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 39 
3.5 Model .......................................................................................................................................... 41 
3.5.1 Model 1 ............................................................................................................................... 41 
3.5.2 Model 2 ............................................................................................................................... 42 
3.6 Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................................... 43 
2 
 
Chapter IV ................................................................................................................................................... 46 
4. RESULTS ........................................................................................................................................... 46 
4.1 Results of Model One ................................................................................................................. 46 
4.2 Results of Model Two ................................................................................................................. 49 
CHAPTER V .............................................................................................................................................. 52 
5. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 52 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................... 54 
Annex 1 ....................................................................................................................................................... 61 


























One of the most important lessons in the 2008 global financial crisis was the cruciality of 
maintaining financial stability and containing systematic risk. Meanwhile, most of the developing 
economies world wide are aiming at increasing the inclusiveness of their financial systems; in 
other words, easier access to financial services of the more vulnerable firms and households in an 
economy. This raises an important question regarding the nature of the relationship between 
financial inclusion and financial stability.  
In recent years, financial inclusion 1 has been on top of official and social initiatives agendas that 
advocates developmental goals. Although financial inclusion is not considered a development goal 
by itself, however, it is as important as any of the goals. Financial Access for households and 
businesses is crucial for their day-to-day activities, as they will be able to financially plan their 
long-term goals, short-term goals and unexpected events. People can then be able to use financial 
services to start new businesses, expand existing ones, invest in health or education, become able 
to manage risks, all of which improve life quality.  However, the importance of financial inclusion 
in any economy didn’t prevent the fact that it is one of the most deficient characteristics in many 
of the worlds’ economies. According to the GPFI (2011), there is about 2.5 billion people in the 
world that are excluded from the usage of formal financial services, which means that 
approximately 30% of the world’s population have no access to the formal financial sector and 
thus are more prone to financial instabilities that may arise. Moreover, approximately only 50% of 
the adult population have an account at a formal financial institution when analyzing data from 
                                                          
1 Financial inclusion is defined as the ability of individuals and businesses to access affordable and useful financial products and 
services that can match their needs delivered in a sustainable and responsible way (World Bank, 2017) 
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148 countries, which means that nearly half of the adult population do not have an account.2 Those 
excluded from using formal financial services have cited high costs as the main reason for their 
exclusion, followed by lack of decent documentation and far physical distance as barriers.  
The World Bank (2017) has estimated that 59% of the 2 billion adults who have no bank accounts 
refer to lack of money as the main reason. This reflects the inability of current financial services 
policies to fit low income users. Other obstacles in opening accounts were cited like the distance 
from the service provider, distrust in financial services providers, religion principles, and 
deficiency of necessary documentation papers. Additionally, an estimate of more than 200 million 
formal and informal MSMEs in emerging economies don’t have access to adequate finance 
required for growth due to lack of collateral, insufficient credit history, and business informality. 
Moreover, some society groups can be more financially excluded than others like women, rural 
areas, poor people, informal business and remote populations.  
According to the above statistics, it is very crucial to closely shed a light on the effect of financial 
inclusion on any economy where it is claimed to reduce poverty levels, enhance more income 
equality, promote sustainable economic growth and thus higher level of financial stability. 
Financial Inclusion is considered an intervention tool that aims at overcoming frictions that form 
an obstacle for markets to operate in favor of the underprivileged and the poor, so they can have 
access to a range of financial services at a fair price without discrimination. In other words, 
financial inclusion offers primary and complementary solutions to reduce poverty and encourage 
inclusive development.3 In fact the United Nations’ 2017 Sustainable Developmental Goals 
(SDGs) will only be reached if there is a sufficient level of financial inclusion. In fact, due to the 
importance of financial inclusion, on 2011, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) announced 
                                                          
2 Kunt, A. D., & Klapper, L. (2012) 
3 Chibba, M. (2009). 
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the MAYA declaration that represented the first platform to set financial inclusion targets for 
member countries. The need to take serious actions that encourage higher levels of financial 
inclusion is increasing given the current financial and economic global environment. It is believed 
that higher levels of financial inclusion promote global financial stability and hence boost 
economic prosperity through increasing level of asset accumulation, smoothing consumption 
patterns, increasing economic growth and decreasing poverty levels 4. Moreover, World Bank 
Group’s Universal Financial Access 2020 initiative was set to target the wide availability of 
Transaction Accounts to people worldwide. Enabling access to Transaction Accounts is an initial 
step to more comprehensive financial inclusion as it allows households to save money, send/ 
receive payments and opens the door for other financial services (World Bank, 2017). 
Moreover, a more inclusive financial sector will create higher levels of greater political and social 
legitimacy. When a large portion of the society are financially excluded from the system, they start 
viewing legal financial institutions, like banks, to be serving the rich for the benefit of other rich 
people.5 Furthermore, financial inclusion can encourage the creation of a more representative 
customer base, and thus legitimizing the industry in the eyes of the public and the activists. When 
financial institutions become less of a political issue, the risk of threatening claims and policies 
advocated by the public decrease, therefore enhancing financial system stability.  According to the 
review of literature, the higher the financial inclusion, the lower the size of the SE (Schneider, F. 
(2013), Rahman, A. (2014)) since the main aim of financial inclusion is to attract the unbanked 
into the formal financial system through moving from a cash-economy to a bank-economy (Khan, 
H. R. (2011) & Chibba, M. (2009)) thus enabling easier surveillance of the transactions taking 
place in the economy and decreasing the size of the SE.  
                                                          
4 Boukhatem, J., (2016)  
5 Rahman, A. (2014) 
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On the other hand, Financial stability is also affected by the size of the SE. One of the arguments 
state that the monetary and fiscal remedial policies of a country approaching a financial shock will 
not be completely passed through if the size of the SE is big, therefore, it acts as an obstacle in the 
path of financial stability. Moreover, the bigger the size of the SE the bigger the chances for 
political and social instability and thus the higher the probability of financial instability (Rahman, 
A. (2014)).  
Therefore, the relationship between financial inclusion and financial stability cannot be analyzed 
without including the size of the SE in the picture. It should be stated that the size of the global SE 
represented around 23% of global GDP in 2011, and it is expected to decline to 21% in 2025, 
however, this decrease is not uniform across all countries. Emerging market economies are 
predicted to witness a fall in the size of SE as they have potential to improve their institutional 
quality and governance while countries with limited capacity will witness an increase in SE size 
(ACCA, June 2017). Additionally, in the Global Financial Stability Report by the IMF (2014) it 
was stated that emerging market economies has witnessed a strong rate of growth of the size of 
banking SE that has outpaced the rate of growth of the traditional banking system, thus implying 
the large size of SE in emerging economies. Emerging economies are of great potential to improve 
international trade relations, increasing global economic growth, and enhancing global living 
standards. 6  
Accordingly, this thesis aims to utilize the importance of the figures and analysis above in order 
to study the effect of financial inclusion and the size of the Shadow Economy (SE hereafter) on 
the level of financial stability in a sample of 20 emerging economies 7 from 2004-2014, while 
                                                          
6 Hanson, G. H. (2012) 
7 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. This group of countries was selected based on the 
availability of data. 
7 
 
controlling for selected macro and micro economic variables. Our analysis will start with 
reviewing previous literature to build a theoretical and empirical framework so that we can analyze 
the channels of the interrelation between inclusion, stability and SE. We utilize the output of this 
theoretical analysis to construct our model and methodology. This thesis uses a panel fixed effects 
two stage linear regression model (2SLS), since the literature reviewed a potential correlation 
between the size of the SE and the level of financial inclusion. Our data set covers 20 emerging 
economies from 2004-2014. Our first stage model is used to create an instrumental variable that 
represent the residual series of the SE, this will be used to project a new fitted variable for the size 
of SE whose error terms are independent of the level of financial inclusion. In the second stage 
model, the fitted variable will be regressed along with financial inclusion and other control 
variables against the degree of financial system instability. Our main findings show that financial 
inclusion has no significant effect on the size of the SE, however, both inclusion and SE can 
















2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
As previously mentioned, the main aim of this thesis is to analyze the effect of financial inclusion 
on the level of stability of the financial sector. In order to do so, we had to build empirical and 
theoretical channels between both variables, and other contributing variables as well. In building 
the theoretical foundation, section 2.1 will start with explaining the concepts of financial inclusion, 
informal (shadow) economy, and financial stability. In section 2.2, a detailed review of previous 
literature will explain the links between financial inclusion and how it contributes to decreasing 
the size of the SE through decreasing intermediation costs and enhancing socio-economic variables 
and thus making it easier for previously financially excluded agents to enter the formal sector. In 
section 2.3, the main factors affecting the financial stability of an economy will be analyzed, one 
of those is the level of financial inclusion, where it influences households’ financial stability, 
banking sector diversification of risks and the economy’s ability to improve the efficiency of 
financial intermediaries and the monetary policy. Other factors influencing financial stability are 
the level of banking sector competition, the quality of the regulation, and the size of the SE. Lastly 
section 2.4 will include a review of previous empirical studies and the hypothesis development.  
2.1 Conceptualizing Financial Inclusion, SE and Financial Stability 
 
 
Financial inclusion is a wide ranging-concept of the process that guarantees availability and ease 
of access to the services provided by the formal financial system as defined by Sarma, M. (2008). 
Kim, D.W. et al. (2018) defined it as the easiness for all the participants in an economy to access 
formal financial services like credit, insurance and bank deposit. Where a high level of 
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inclusiveness will allow the economy to operate in an environment that makes the participants 
benefit from the use of those financial services and thus reach capital and financial stability. 
In the analysis of financial inclusion, it is crucial to differentiate between involuntary and voluntary 
exclusion. Voluntary exclusion is the state where some of the economic agents choose not to use 
formal financial services due to religious or cultural beliefs or sometimes they are not in need for 
those services. On the other hand, involuntary exclusion happens due to income constraints and 
high-risk profiles faced by some economic agents or due to market inefficiency that leads to 
discrimination. The World Bank (2014) advocates that research and policy initiatives must clearly 
focus on involuntary financial inclusion as it can be addressed and reduced using various economic 
programs. Norris E.D. et al. (2015) classified three main constraints to financial inclusion in an 
economy, first participation costs; determined by transaction costs and documentation 
requirements, second borrowing constraints; determined by collateral requirements and borrowing 
costs, and third intermediation costs; determined by interest rate spreads and fees, and banks’ 
monitoring costs. The higher those three constraints are, the more the level of financial exclusion 
in an economy.   
On the other hand, SE is another multifaceted concept that is extremely hard to measure and define 
since agents operating under a SE do their best to remain unidentified.  SE can also be named 
hidden economy, black economy, cash economy or informal economy. All those names reflect the 
presence of informal economy that is defined by Schneider, F. et al. (2018) as: all economic 
activities that are hidden from official authorities and institutions for regulatory, institutional and 
monetary reasons. Institutionally, SE can arise due to weak rule of law, extensive corruption and 
low quality of political institutions. Regulatory reasons can vary from the high burden of the 
regulatory framework to avoiding bureaucratic practices. Monetary reasons include tax and other 
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social payments evasion. It is of great importance for the governments and policy makers to 
measure the size of the SE as total economic activities; including formal and informal production 
of goods and services is a necessity for designing sound economic policies. Accordingly, SE 
measures used in their analysis mostly reflect legal economic and productive activities that if were 
recorded would be able to contribute in measuring the national GDP, therefore, their definition of 
SE excludes any criminal and illegal activities.  
Since the recent global financial crisis, the notion of financial stability has been put under the spot 
light by policy makers. They have been trying to determine what are the factors that contribute to 
a more stable financial system, in order to prevent potential crises. Since, the most vulnerable to 
the adverse effect of those crises are the poor, financial inclusion is expected to play a significant 
role in stabilizing and minimizing the losses. However, there has been little empirical evidence on 
the linkages between financial inclusion and financial stability as stated by Cull, R. et al. (2012).   
The excess credit creation in 2008 has significantly harmed economic growth rates; thus, financial 
stability, in many of the advanced economies like France, Germany, and the UK, while other 
emerging economies like India and China sustained their high growth rates amidst the crisis.  
Therefore, the choice of this thesis to the emerging economies was made from curiosity of this 
interesting co-integration between financial inclusion and growth in the long run. 
There are various studies that analyze the effect of financial inclusion on major economic 
variables, however, only few studies analyze its effect on financial system stability and efficiency. 
This goes back to the fact that financial inclusion importance has been highlighted by the world 
governments only recently and specially after the latest global financial crises. The below literature 
shows that higher levels of financial inclusion can have positive or adverse effect of the stability 
of the financial system. The positive effects can be represented by higher diversification of bank 
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assets thus decreasing the risks associated, less volatility in the banks’ deposit base thus reducing 
liquidity risks and a better transmission of monetary policy and objectives. The adverse effects can 
be represented by the attrition of credit standards, the inefficient application of regulations guiding 
financial institutions and the increased risk of eroding banks reputation.  Using an extensive review 
of previous theoretical and empirical literature, this thesis will try to build a framework that links 
financial inclusion, SE and financial stability to proceed with the analysis.  
2.2 Financial Inclusion and the Shadow Economy 
 
The more the financial system is able to include economic agents under its umbrella, the smaller the size of 
the SE. However, for an economic agent to be included in the formal financial system, several factors have 
to be considered, like the cost of financial services, the level of income acting as a collateral and the 
sustainable growth of the real and formal economic sector. The section below discusses how can the level 
of financial inclusion affect the size of the SE through its impact on intermediation costs reduction and 
other socio-economic variables like inclusive growth, employment and equality. 
2.2.1 Intermediation Costs  
 
Financial and credit markets characteristics play a crucial role in determining the size of SE where 
low levels of financial development; determined by high costs of financial intermediation, can 
create incentives for economic agents to partially distribute their wealth on formal and informal 
sectors. Blackburn, K., et al. (2012) stated that those incentives can be represented in avoidance of 
paying taxes on wealth, earning a black-market rate of return on investments and exemption from 
official rules and regulations, all on the cost of sacrificing the benefits they might earn if engaged 
in the formal economy. 
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The level of financial development also plays an important role in reducing the size of the SE as 
firms can reduce the cost of credit through the full or the partial disclosure of their assets as 
collateral. This disclosure can increase the amount of taxes paid by firms and reduces the 
probability of tax evasion, but at the same time it decreases the size of the informal economy 
(Capasso, S. et al., 2013). 
2.2.3 Social legitimacy 
 
Financial inclusion can also offer mechanisms to decrease the size of the SE through regaining the 
trust of economic agents in the formal financial sector. These mechanisms are all directed to 
increase the monitoring ability of a customer in any undertaken financial transaction. According 
to Schneider, F. (2013) engaging in SE is enhanced the more convenient it is to pay in cash, since 
cash payments cannot be easily traced. Therefore, the more financially included households and 
SMEs are, the higher their contribution to a cashless economy is, and the less is the SE 
development. In other words, since SE is a cash-based economy where cash transactions are one 
of its pillars, and since SE provides incentives for market players to save outside the formal 
financial system, contributing to this cash-based informal sector can allow people to get away with 
tax payments, social security payments, labor regulations and required paperwork. Thus, the higher 
the cost of saving, the lower the financial inclusion and the larger the size of SE. Moreover, Bachas, 
P., et al. (2016) argued that the increased usage of debit cards due to higher financial inclusion 
offers an efficient mechanism to bank account owners to monitor their balances leading to more 
trust in the financial system, discouraging the dependence of informal financial sector and thus 
improving financial system efficiency and stability.   
It is a widely known behavior when a crisis emerges, people tend to turn against their once so-
trusted financial institutions, without putting into account their own actions that have caused the 
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crises to emerge. In fact, this behavior was so apparent in the most recent global financial crises, 
where the client’s anger was directly put at bankers, regardless the fairness of this action.  Rahman, 
A. (2014) attributed this to the fact that the public always subconsciously see financial institutions 
as tools of created by the rich people to serve their own interest, however, this will not be the way 
of thinking if more and more were included in the financial system so that the customer base 
becomes unbiased and more representative, especially in low-income and rural segments. Once 
higher levels of financial inclusion can be reached, people will re-trust the financial system and 
view it as a tool for helping people, increasing the legitimacy of the financial system and thus 
enhancing the stability if the economy faces a potential down turn.  
2.2.4 Socioeconomic variables  
 
Higher levels of financial inclusion, thus financial development leads to the allocation of the 
economy’s resources in a way that not only allows higher capital accumulation but also enhances 
productivity growth. In their study, Rioja, F., & Valev, N. (2004) concluded that in higher income 
countries, finance primarily boosts growth through accelerating productivity growth, on the other 
hand, finance in lower income countries boosts growth through speeding-up capital accumulation. 
Higher financial inclusion can be a key determinant of a more stable financial sector specially 
when this increase is targeting small firms in the services sector 8. In this view, Prasad, E.  (2010) 
argued that lack of access to finance for small businesses and entrepreneurs in the services sector 
might have adverse effect on the rate of employment in this sector, which can then threaten the 
economic and financial stability.  
                                                          
8 As operations in the services sector are relatively more labor intensive. 
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Access to finance for the less privileged classes in the economy can offer an opportunity for them 
to start their businesses and guaranteeing a stable stream of income that wasn’t attainable before 
as discussed by Burgess, R., & Pande, R. (2005) and Levine, R. (2005). This will reduce income 
inequality and unfair concentrations of wealth across economic agents, that in most cases lead to 
rapid credit growth rates, asset price bubbles and social instability, encouraging the refute of those 
vulnerable economic agents to the informal sector for meeting their basic needs.  
In an analysis developed by Norris, E.D., et al. (2015) for Costa Rica and Peru, the two countries 
have witnessed a decrease in the level of inequality as the credit constraint fell. This is based on 
the reasoning that a decline in the cost of credit (participation costs) can represent a great benefit 
for new entrants, therefore decreasing the size of the SE. Since previously constrained talented 
entrepreneurs are now able to expand and hire more workers whom in turn will take higher wages, 
income inequality and size of SE can furtherly be reduced. However, when the analysis was 
applied to Uruguay and Guatemala, relaxing the borrowing constraints has only served the 
privileged and talented entrepreneurs, raising their profits and therefore, increasing the GINI 
coefficient and increasing the chances of the dominance of the SE. In other words, a decrease in 
the required collateral to increase financial inclusion will allow agents who were already included 
in the formal financial system to benefit more relative to the benefit that they can acquire from the 
reduction in the cost of credit, since this cost constitutes a negligible and relatively fixed share of 
their income. While on the other hand, furtherly excludes the less vulnerable from the formal 
system.  
Honohan, P. (2004) stated that the socio-economic impact of increased financial inclusion might 
only be witnessed in the long run. In fact, the effects of higher financial inclusion can have an 
intertemporal and multidimensional characteristic. Beegle, K., et al. (2003) analysis of Tanzania 
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showed that better access to financial services by households was found to substitute child labor 
according the micro-survey data. The analysis has shown that the long-run consequences on the 
levels of income, education and thus the degree of financial literacy might only be witnessed by 
coming generations. The additional increments of income to a household; due to the easier access 
to credit, might be used to decrease child labor and increase schooling years, where a better 
qualified and educated labor force will be able to decrease income inequality and thus the 
participation int the informal sector. Better financial inclusion can empower the poor through 
enhancing their wellbeing and community status.  
2.3 Factors Affecting Financial Stability 
 
Since financial stability is a multidimensional concept, there exists many factors that can directly 
and indirectly influence it. In the following section, we construct a theoretical framework showing 
the main factors that affect the stability of the financial system in an economy. We start with 
financial inclusion, that not only influences the size of the SE as discussed in section 2.2, but it 
also influences banking sector, household and country characteristics that affect the level of 
financial stability. The effect of the level of banking sector competition (concentration), the quality 
and strength of laws and regulation and the size of the SE are also believed to affect the level of 
financial stability.  
2.3.1 Financial Inclusion 
 
The level of financial inclusion can affect financial stability through several channels. Those 
channels can be country-level i.e. efficiency of financial institutions and monetary policy, bank-
level i.e. diversification of customer base, and household-level i.e. stabilizing households financial 
position. Those channels are thoroughly discussed below.  
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i. Diversification of deposit and loan bases  
 
Increased financial inclusion is claimed to create a more stable financial system through the more 
diversified division of risk it creates.  In fact, Financial inclusion promotes the creation of a more 
diversified funding and deposit bases thus helping in solving liquidity crises while enhancing the 
financial institutions ability to retain funds and/or attract new funds. Theory suggests that when 
there are numerous small depositors and borrowers, the financial system can divide the risk on 
many small clients instead a small number of large corporate clients. Rahman, A. (2014) attributed 
that to the fact that small clients, either households or micro enterprises, tend to abide to a given 
financial service provider, opposing to large clients that tend to shop around. Since small clients 
are less prone to be affected by adverse news or rumor about their service providers. Therefore, 
the larger the number of retail depositors/borrowers there are, the more stable a financial institution 
tends to be.  This diversification of risk can also benefit the financial institutions from a risk 
management stand point, since modeling a portfolio of a large number of small loans is much 
easier; therefore, leading to better prediction of loan losses, more accurate loan pricing and more 
stable stream of profits for the banking system. Moreover, offering SMEs better access to financial 
services; lending in particular, will decrease the probability of default and provisions to non-
performing loans of financial institutions. 
Morgan, P.J. & Pontines, V. (2014) claim that diversified loans to small businesses tend to 
represent less systemic risk than other more concentrated large loans. Additionally, Financial 
inclusion makes the intermediation process between savings and investments more stable through 
facilitating the diversification of the transactions that take place, the client base, the risks created, 
and the financial institutions involved (see also Khan, H.R. (2011); Hannig, A., & Jensen, S. 
(2010); Denizer, C., et al. (2002)). Additionally, according to Prasasd, E. (2010) higher levels of 
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financial inclusion encourage higher domestic savings, therefore, enhancing the funding of 
domestic investments while decreasing the economy’s dependence of foreign financing. 
Moreover, Financial inclusion is able to attract depositors whose financial behavior can alleviate 
instabilities at times of distress according to Hijalee, M. et al. (2017). In other words, with higher 
levels of financial inclusion, the financial sector’s balance sheet will then include a wider range of 
economic agents.  
ii. Efficient allocation of Resources 
 
Since a high degree of financial development enhances financial inclusion and vice versa, it is of 
great importance to analyze the nature of relation between financial development and the 
efficiency of the financial sector. Levine, R. (2005) argued that the financial system plays a key 
role in the provision of information, and in the reduction of decision-making and transaction costs.  
Gheeraert, L., & Weill, L. (2015) explained the channels by which higher levels of financial 
development can reduce information asymmetry. First, one of the major functions of the financial 
system is the provision of projected information about potential investments. Consequently, banks; 
as major players in any financial system, are able to utilize this information in decreasing the 
evaluation costs of potential investments, allowing for a more efficient use of capital, and thus 
enhancing productivity. Second, financial institutions can enhance productivity through 
decreasing costs of transactions that are accompanied with the transfer of funds between different 
economic agents. This is mainly due to the ability of the financial system to pool savings which 
reduce the information costs for lenders and savers.  
Additionally, financial inclusion is able to alleviate information asymmetry as the higher 
availability of bank branches and ATMs, the smaller the distance between the FI and customers is, 
and the better information banks receive regarding the quality of the client base. Consequently, 
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better information about customers greatly aids FI in making judicious lending and borrowing 
decision while setting a representative and fair price for the services provided, which can greatly 
reduce the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Sharpe, S.A. (1990); Buch, C.M. et 
al. (2013); Petersen, M.A. et al. (1994)). 
According to Norris, E.D., et al.  (2015) viewed that reducing credit constraints was found, i.e.; 
lower costs of participation, increases productivity as the credit offered to talented entrepreneurs 
is being allocated more efficiently, meanwhile fewer credit will be wasted in the inefficient and 
unproductive processes of contract negotiations. Adding to that, Subbarao, D. (2009) explained 
that higher financial inclusion can improve the efficiency of government payments as those can be 
electronically deposited directly to the beneficiaries’ bank accounts, therefore decreasing 
transaction costs, leakages and pilferages. This can lead to a more efficient allocation of 
government funds towards more productive channels.  
iii. Monetary Policy Effectiveness  
 
Financial inclusion is crucial for central banks to stabilize the financial systems and to efficiently 
manage the monetary policy, as higher financial inclusion can greatly alter consumers’ and firms’ 
behavior. Since financial inclusion enables the participation of a larger sector of the economy in 
the formal financial system, therefore it creates a positive externality in the economy since it allows 
a more effective monetary policy implementation and transmission. 
In fact, higher financial inclusion allows interest rates to become an effective policy tool, it also 
facilitates the mechanism through which Central Banks can stabilize price levels according to 
Mehrotra, A., & Yetman, J. (2014). Since inclusion allows higher levels of consumption 
smoothing, households are then better able to respond to changes in interest rates through adjusting 
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their level of savings and loans. Higher financial inclusion can also encourage households to 
convert their savings into deposits and away from physical assets.  Khan H.R. (2011) and Tombini, 
A. (2012) agreed that higher levels of financial inclusion makes interest rates a relatively strong 
and primary policy tool. As financial inclusion increase, money stock starts to be converted from 
currency in circulation to interest bearing deposits in the banking system. This allows a large 
portion of the economic activity (i.e. broad money) to be under the control of interest rates.  
Khan H.R. (2011) argues the bigger the informal sector is, the harder it is for a monetary policy to 
be implemented and transmitted, as the decisions of larger number of households and small 
business owners will be independently without putting into consideration the central banks’ 
monetary policy actions. Additionally, financial inclusion encourages people to move from cash 
economy to bank economy, so their financial transactions can be surveilled. Consequently, anti-
money laundry guidelines can be efficiently implemented to the majority of financial transactions 
in the economy. 
Difficulties in smoothing consumption is thus attributed to limited access to formal financial 
services, the thing that can influence the efficiency of monetary policy through three dimensions. 
First, the bigger the number of financially excluded agents in an economy, the stronger the required 
change in interest rate to stabilize a shock in aggregate demand and price levels (Galí, J., 2004). 
Second, financial inclusion can influence the output-inflation volatility trade-off. Mehrotra, A., & 
Yetman, J. (2014) clarified that when more agents are included in the formal financial system, 
output volatility will rise relative to inflation volatility, as financial included agents are then better 
able to alter their investment and saving decisions so that they partially insulate their consumption 
levels form volatilities in output. Therefore, as financial inclusion increases, central banks become 
better able to focus on prices stabilization and thus enhancing financial stability. Thirdly, in some 
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countries central banks focus on core inflation as a measure to determine its’ inflation objectives, 
however, the choice of this price index can sometimes be misleading.  
Mbutor, M. O., & Uba, I. A. (2013) analyzed the impact of the level of financial inclusion on the 
effectiveness on the monetary policy in Nigeria from 1980 to 2012. Their results advocate the 
claim that higher levels of financial inclusion play an important role in making monetary policy 
more effective. However, this result was not applicable when the variable of number of bank 
branches was included, in fact depicted a negative relation. This goes to the fact the aim of banks 
when opening new branches is mainly pursuing higher profits but not for increasing financial 
inclusions. Consequently, new branches start to open in locations that bring more profits even if 
those new branches are underutilized, while unfavorable locations for profits remain underbanked, 
thus decreasing financial inclusion. Since financial inclusion is a policy objective, lower financial 
inclusion makes the central banks unable to influence savings, consumption, and investment 
behavior through monetary policy tools (i.e. interest rates and exchange rates), therefore 
decreasing the effectiveness of those tools on the financial system.  
In their study, Anand, R., & Prasad, E. S. (2012) argued that some inflation measures like “core-
inflation” excludes prices of food products which inaccurately guides policymakers in economies 
with high levels of financial exclusion. The reason behind this claim is that high levels of financial 
exclusion are usually present in rural areas that depend on agriculture and food products as a main 
source of income. When prices of food products increase, financial excluded economic agents will 
be more prone to increase their consumption as their incomes rise. Consequently, an overall 
increase in consumption due to an unaccounted-for increase in prices of food products will lead to 
further increases in inflation induced from increases in aggregate demand. Under these conditions, 
the central bank objective to stabilize price levels can be very hard since changes in food prices 
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are unaccounted for.   Not only does financial inclusion improve the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy of the government, but it also greatly advances the monetary strategic behavior of 
households and firms, therefore, leading to a further increase in the monetary policy effectiveness. 
Bhaskar, P. V. (2013)  
iv. Households financial Stability  
 
Higher financial inclusion increases the poor households’ ability to withstand income shocks that 
could temporarily or permanently make their consumption levels near or sometimes below the 
poverty line. Moreover, access to better insurance can indirectly increase those households’ 
confidence to engage in riskier; thus, more rewarding, economic activities that increase their 
income and their productivity as argued by Matin L. et al. (2002). Additionally, higher access to 
credit can induce poor households to accumulate capital; whether human or physical, that can 
potentially yield a return that exceeds the cost of credit itself, therefore generating higher income. 
Lastly, better financial accessibility reduces the cost of financial transactions, domestically and 
abroad on a secure basis. 
In fact, access to financial services for the poor will lead to the provision of a more stable and 
diversified retail deposits base since low income households who engage in saving or borrowing 
transactions; tend to preserve a proportionally steady financial behavior, thus enjoying a higher 
level of immunity against the business cycle fluctuations. Hannig, A., & Jensen, S., (2010) 
attributed this to the increased ability of low income depositors in preserving the level of their 
deposits at times of crises. In fact, they act as a continuous source of funds to the financial system 
even when other channels of credit become harder to maintain. Higher rate of financial inclusion 
for the poor can then reduce dependence of banks on “non-core” financing. In other words, it will 
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increase deposit and loan stability since financial institutions might lose their ability to lend if 
those sources of deposits stop. 
Financial Inclusion can indirectly affect financial stability as argued by Rahman, A. (2014) and 
Khan, H. R. (2011) through its effect on the financial stability of poor households. Financial 
inclusion can promote financial household stability through offering them a safe place for their 
savings thus encouraging an increase in their saving ratio relative to their disposable income. These 
savings are crucial for households’ financial stability in that they smooth consumption patterns in 
periods of low income and provide necessary funds for unexpected and necessary consumption, 
therefore decreasing the probability of falling into debt or even defaulting. Moreover, granting 
financial access to households and the less privileged improves their ability to receive government 
transfers during times of economic distress without the threat of being lost if those transfers were 
in the form of cash-in-hand. By the same scope, Denizer, C., et al. (2000) argued that financial 
inclusion improves households’ financial position and stability, creates a more efficient channel 
of the provision of transfer payments that are crucial for the vulnerable to survive economic cycle 
fluctuations, and prevents the loss of those payments in the informal sector. In fact, economies that 
tend to make financial services more available to the unbanked in order to reduce market 
fluctuations, is thus more able to increase funding sources and efficiently allocate credit. 
Additionally, financial inclusion affects the severity of the business cycle fluctuations through its 
effect on increasing the financial stability of the market as well as that of the poor households.  
Financial inclusion sometimes affects the business cycle in the short run through its role in 
changing in supply and demand of available resources for investments which can lead to short run 
variations as argued by Hijalee, M. et al. (2017). For instance, the sudden supply of investment 
resources like credit can lead to a surplus of deposits therefore affecting lending interest rates. 
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However, in the long run, increased financial inclusion can lead to a higher and a more sustainable 
growth due to higher investment levels in productive capacities 
Not only does financial inclusion improve the effectiveness of the monetary policy of the 
government, but it also greatly advances the monetary strategic behavior of households and firms, 
therefore, leading to a further increase in the monetary policy effectiveness. Bhaskar, P. V. (2013) 
argued that financial inclusion leads to higher stability through the enhancement of the financial 
education it causes, and the interaction between those three elements represents the demand and 
supply side of the financial market. Higher financial inclusion for households and firms means that 
it will subject them to events that enhances their financial literacy. Financial literacy will then 
create higher demand for financial services since it provides awareness and knowledge about the 
available financial services, while, easier access to finance represent the supply side. Both demand 
and supply elements will then lead to higher financial stability of the economy and the society. 
Aziz, Z. A.  (2005) stated that high levels of financial inclusion can make households better able 
to manage their risks through financial literacy that makes them better judges on deciding their 
capacity to borrow, save and spend, and deciding on the most optimal financial service that meets 
their needs. Allen, F. et al. (2016) argued that higher levels of financial inclusion are associated 
with higher political stability and stronger rule of law due to the positive impact of financial 
inclusion on business activities, self-employment, household consumption and wellbeing. 
2.3.2 Banking Competition/Concentration 
 
There exist two contradicting views regarding the relationship between concentration and financial 
stability, the competition-fragility view and the competition-stability view. The competition-
fragility hypothesis claims that although higher market power of banks will increase interest 
charged, boost profits, and improve stability as argued by Boyd, J. H., & De Nicoló, G. (2005). 
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However, this claim can be distorted by the fact that an increase in interest will subject borrowers 
and firms to higher credit risks and larger bankruptcy probability, therefore, increasing the 
potential for non-performing loans.  Moreover, it is believed that policymakers treat bank failures 
more seriously when there are few banks in the market as the default of one bank can lead to the 
collapse of the whole market. However, this might not always be in favor of financial stability as 
Mishkin, F. S. (1998) argued that this will induce governments to provide more subsidies to the 
few big banks in the market, which encourages them to perform operations in a riskier way and 
increase the system’s fragility. 
The competition-fragility view is based on the reasoning that in an increasingly competitive 
financial environment, profits witness more pressures and banks are more induced to take higher 
risks, resulting in higher banking sector fragility according to Beck, T. (2008). Moreover, Allen, 
F., & Gale, D. (2001) viewed that the higher the level of concentration of banks, the smaller the 
number of banks, and therefore reducing the government’s burden of supervision and enhancing 
the stability of the banking system. A countervailing point of view claims that the complexity of a 
bank is positively related to its size, so a big bank will be harder to monitor than a small one due 
to the complexity of its operations. In a competitive market where all banks are price takers, 
competition impedes any incentive for a bank to provide liquidity to a defaulting bank, thus greatly 
contributing to more fragility.  
Since financial institutions can benefit from economies of scale due the increase in the availability 
of information as financial inclusion increase, some institutions can exploit this benefit to achieve 
higher market power. Market power is generally measured by the difference between market price 
and the marginal cost of an extra unit as a percentage of the market price, therefore, higher market 
power can give an indication whether FI are able to minimize costs or not. Petersen, M. A., & 
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Rajan, R. G. (1994) stated that if a bank enjoys a lower marginal cost, it should be able to decrease 
the degree of excessive risk taking through providing credit to small and medium clients, therefore 
leading to higher levels of financial stability. 
2.3.3  Quality of Regulations 
 
The effect of the level of financial inclusion on financial stability strictly depends on the quality 
of regulation and supervision of the banking sector. When access to credit is expanded with no 
proper regulation or supervision, financial stability risk starts to emerge. According to Sahay, R. 
et al. (2015), under a strong banking supervision, extending credit is accompanied with higher 
bank buffers, thus enhancing financial stability. Conversely, under weaker banking supervision, 
extending credit leads to fall in financial stability due to lower bank buffers (see also Mehrotra, 
A., & Yetman, J. (2015)).  
2.3.4 Size of the Shadow Economy 
 
The existence of a large parallel economy encourages the use of unstable and informal saving 
channel which can adversely affect the stability of the financial system.  In countries with low 
formal financial sector penetrations, alternative saving channels usually emerge as stated by 
Rahman, A. (2014). For example, during the 1990s, Albania’s formal financial sector was not 
easily accessible by households and microenterprises. This has paved the way for the emergence 
of “Pyramid Schemes”; an alternative saving channel that promises higher returns for participants 
the more they bring others into the scheme. Pyramids Schemes usually collapses when the pool of 
potential participants dries up, thus when the scheme collapsed, participants rioted. The instability 
caused by participants frustrations led to many casualties, high inflation rates, depreciation of 
domestic currency and a 7% decrease in output in one year. Adding to Albania, Kenya and 
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Bangladesh have also suffered from low financial inclusion that directed the financially excluded 
to use informal investing channels leading to financial instability.  
The prevalence of SE can impede the stability of the financial system through the extent of which 
people are able to acquire credit from the informal sector. The higher their ability to acquire credit 
informally, the lower the demand on credit in the formal sector, which might create financial 
market distortions according to Gobbi, G., & Zizza, R. (2007). Additionally, a decrease in financial 
inclusion can adversely affect financial stability due to the anti-cyclical behavior of participants in 
the underground economy.  The participation in the informal financial sector can make participants 
suffer from lack of capital and credit, thus making it more unfeasible to invest and/or consume up 
to their full potential. This in return can lead to reducing economic growth in expansionary periods, 
forcing those participants to be locked in this anti-cyclical behavior and never reaching neither 
optimum production nor consumption potential. 
Albulescu et al. (2016) argued that financial stability can affect the size of SE, where higher stability 
means better access to finance and encourages investments. One the other hand, lower financial 
stability can diminish the overall level of income thus forming an obstacle for easier access to 
finance; i.e. lower income means higher collateral needed to be included in the formal financial 
system. Consequently, economic agents will be induced to develop unauthorized activities, to 
evade tax payments and to engage in the informal sector.  
2.4 Empirical Literature and Hypothesis Development 
This section will review most of the empirical studies that analyzed the relation between financial 
stability, financial inclusion and the size of the SE regarding the data used, the variables chosen, 
and the econometric methodology applied. From this review we compose the hypotheses employed 
in this thesis that chapters 3 and 4 will be build upon.  
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2.4.1 Financial Inclusion and the Size of the Shadow Economy 
Berdiev, A. N., & Saunoris, J. W. (2016) examined the relation between the level of financial 
development and the size of the SE for 161 countries from 1960-2009. By using a panel VAR, 
their findings show that higher levels of financial development will reduce the size of the SE. In 
measuring the multidimensional variable of financial development, domestic credit provided to 
the private sector was included as a dimension of financial inclusion. Moreover, the study found 
that there is an evidence for a reverse casual relation between financial development and the size 
of the SE, where a shock to the SE led to lower financial development. This reverse causality was 
clear among countries that has low financial development.  
Using a unique firm level data of 54 countries, Beck, T., et al. (2005) investigated the effect of the 
financial and legal constraints as well as corruption on rate of growth of firms. They argued that 
higher financial inclusion to firms decreases liquidity constraints and encourages higher levels of 
investment. Moreover, the distribution of credit among firms in low income countries within the 
same sector significantly impacts the structure and the competition of the industry as well as the 
level of informality in the sector.  As portrayed by Harrison, A. E., & McMillan, M. S. (2003) in 
Cote d’Ivoire, the largest firms or multinational corporations can sometimes reap most of the 
increased financial inclusion, opposed by the smallest local firms that usually are crowded out 
from funding. 
In their analysis, Capasso, S. & Jappelli, T. (2013) have tested the relation between the level of 
financial development defined as the reduction of cost of external credit and the size of the informal 
economy, using Italian microeconomic data. Their findings show that higher local levels of 
financial development are indeed accompanied with smaller size of informal economy.  
According to the previous literature we build our first hypothesis: 
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H01: Financial Inclusion has a significant negative effect on the size of the SE. 
2.4.2 Financial Inclusion, Shadow Economy and Financial Stability 
 
As previously mentioned, the empirical research on this topic is very limited. Below are some of 
the studies that tried to tackle the relation from different points of view.  Han, R., & Melecky, M. 
(2013) found that an increase in percentage of people who have bank accounts by 10% led to a 
decrease in the deposit withdrawal rates (proxy for financial instability) by 3-8% during economic 
downturns. Sahay, R., et al. (2015) analyzed the relation between inclusion and stability from 
2004-2011 using number of borrowers per 1,000 adults as a proxy for financial inclusion and bank 
z-score as a proxy for financial stability. Using panel regression with country fixed effects they 
found that, higher financial inclusion led to a decrease in the bank z-score, thus leading to higher 
instability in the financial system. While higher level of banking system supervision led to a higher 
bank z-score and a more stable financial system. 
Morgan, P.J. & Pontines, V. (2014) have analyzed this relation using a GMM dynamic panel 
estimator and found that there is a positive relation between inclusion and stability. Their evidence 
was that higher share of lending to SMEs as a percentage of total lending enhanced the financial 
system stability through decreasing the NPL and Z-score of the analyzed sample. Their findings 
also state that higher GDP per capita leads to higher financial stability while an increase in the 
private bank credit to GDP ratio has the opposite effect. 
According to Neaime, S. (2018) the empirical evidence from 8 MENA countries suggests that 
financial inclusion positively affect financial stability, though uncoordinated financial inclusion 
contributes to higher financial instability. One factor that has been contributing to the increased 
financial instability in the MENA region is the insufficiency of robust economic and political 
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institutions to regulate and supervise the financial markets. The lack of those institutions could 
result in economic and financial crisis, thus increasing poverty and inequality levels. 
Moreover, Norris, E.D. et al. (2015) tested the claim of the potential stability-growth trade off 
which is based on the effect of reducing borrowing constraints on GDP and NPL in Guatemala 
and Peru. The findings showed that as the constraints to borrowing became more and more relaxed, 
the GDP of both countries have significantly increased, but at the same time, the NPL ratio has 
increased. This means that as the borrowing constraints fell, more external credit was being 
provided to potential and existing entrepreneurs as soon as they pay the cost of credit, which 
attracts more investors. At the same time, and due to the relaxation of the loans’ collateral 
constraints, potentially riskier small-sized entrepreneurs who are more leveraged enter the market, 
and therefore increasing the value of NPLs.  
In their analysis, Čihák, M., et al. (2016) concluded that increase financial inclusion can provide 
factors that aids in mitigating medium-term instabilities and expected loss like reducing the NPL 
ratio to total loans and reducing the volatility of deposit growth rates. Their findings also show 
that financial inclusion can sometimes create an extensive usage of credit which leads to higher 
risks and increasing the probabilities of unexpected losses to arise; represented by diminishing 
liquidity and capital buffers). Moreover, the relation between inclusion and stability is significantly 
affected by country-level characteristics like the degree of fiscal freedom, financial openness, 
education and the development of credit information systems. Financial openness was found to 
enhance the trade-off between stability and inclusion, while fiscal freedom, information system 




By using GMM dynamic panel model on panel date from 2001-2013, Siddik, N. A., & Kabiraj, S. 
(2018) has concluded that financial inclusion measured by ration of SME loans outstanding and 
ratio of SME borrower to total borrower, had a significant positive relation with a country’s level 
of financial stability measured by its bank Z-score. The study also concluded that GDP per capita, 
private credit to GDP and liquidity are positively related to financial stability, while domestic 
credit to private sector and financial crises dummy were found to be negatively related to financial 
stability. 
Aahmed, M. M., & Mallick, S. K. (2017) used an international sample of 2635 banks in 86 
countries from 2004-2012 in analyzing the relation between financial inclusion and banking 
stability. Their findings show that financial inclusion is positively related to banks stability, 
specifically the banks who have lower marginal costs, higher shares of customer deposit funding, 
and who operate in countries with better quality of institutions.  
Osvaldo, A. et al. (2006) have studied the Chilean banking system and concluded that the 
probability of the frequent occurrence of large losses was more severe when analyzing the NPL 
ratio of small firms relative to large ones. This was represented in by a quasi-normal distribution 
of loss of small firms and a fat-tailed loss distribution for large ones. Those conclusions reflect the 
lower systematic risk of the small loans when compared to large loans, which brings up the 
importance of increasing the financial inclusion of SMEs to enhance financial stability. 
According to the above literature, we build the following hypotheses 
H02: Financial inclusion has a significant negative effect on financial instability. 




2.4.3 Banking Competition and Financial Stability 
Keeley, M. C. (1990) studied the US banking system degree of competition in the 1990s and found 
that higher competition reduces the capital cushion for banks and increased risk premiums. He 
explained that an excessively competitive banking system creates higher pressures on banks to 
maintain their profits inducing a riskier behavior and thus a more fragile financial system. 
Moreover, Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2001, 2004) found that the higher the banking sector competition, 
the greater the probability of borrower to switch between banks, indicating a lower incentive for 
banks to keep its customers and consequently, not screening the borrowers as effectively as before. 
Therefore, hindering the banking sector stability.  
Ben Ali, M. S., et al. (2018) have analyzed the relation between concentration of the banking sector 
and financial stability from 1980-2011 for a sample of 156 developing and developed economies. 
Their results show that there is no direct relation between concentration and stability, however, 
there was two indirect channels through which concentration significantly affects stability. 
Banking concentration has a stabilizing positive effect on stability through profitability where 
concentration leads to higher revenues, increases the capital of banks and thus the ability of banks 
to absorb shocks increases. On the other hand, lower banks competition means that banks can lend 
borrowers at higher rates of interest, which has a destabilizing negative effect. Higher interest rates 
crowd out customers with the least risk appetite, attract more risky customers whom behavior can 
decrease the sectors stability, and increase the prevalence of borrowers defaulting (see also Boyd, 
J. H., & De Nicoló, G. (2005)). 
Cuestas, J.C. et al. (2017) assessed the tradeoff between financial stability and the banking sector 
competition for a sample of commercial banks in the Baltic region from 2000 to 2014. The 
assessment was conducted through using Lerner Index and the market shares of top banks as two 
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alternative measures for the banking sector competition, while using banks Z-scores and loan loss 
reserves as alternative measures for the banking sector risk; proxy for financial system stability. 
The results show that the lower the competition in the banking sector, the higher the banks’ risk-
taking behavior and probability of default, since the excessive increase in banks’ market power 
will induce individual banks to be involved in risky transactions, thus threatening the stability of 
the financial system. 
Kasman, S., & Kasman, A. (2015) analyzed the relationship between the level of competition and 
concentration of banks in Turkey from 2002-2012 and found that more competitive the banking 
system is the higher bank Z-score and the lower the NPL; where bank Z-score and NPL where 
used as proxies for financial stability. In measuring competition, they used Lerner Index adjusted 
for efficiency and the Boone indicator as proxies. Their results indicate that higher levels of 
banking sector concentration increase the NPL ratio and decreases the Z-score, thus increasing the 
level of financial stability. Moreover, it was found that sometimes higher competition levels, and 
a lower market power of each bank, can be associated with decreasing profit margins and 
increasing the incentives of banks to take risks, thus hindering the stability of the banking sector. 
According to the above literature we build our fourth hypothesis:  








3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
In this chapter, the used data, data sources and research methodology will be discussed. To explain 
the relationship between financial stability, financial inclusion and size of SE, our analysis will be 
conducted on a group of 20 emerging countries from 2004-20149.  Section 3.1 will start with 
describing the selected variables, along with its sources and reference to previous studies. In 
performing our empirical analysis, we construct an index for financial inclusion and an index for 
financial instability respectively, therefore, in section 3.2 and 3.3 a full description of the 
methodology used to construct those indices will be stated. In section 3.4, the selected econometric 
methodology that will be used in conducting our empirical analysis will be thoroughly discussed. 
Section 3.5 will represent the econometric model and the selection of the dependent and the 
independent variables. Section 3.6 will include summary statistics of the variables used in the 
analysis.  
3.1 Data Sources  
 
For Financial Stability, we use 2 key variables to measure the level of financial system stability, 
the variables and their potential effects on financial stability are stated below. The data for the 
following variables was retrieved from GFDD, and were employed by number of scholars 
(Morgan, P.J., et al. (2014); Čihák, M., et al. (2016); Sahay, R., et al. (2015); and Kasman, S., & 
Kasman, A. (2015)). (1) Banks non-performing loans to gross loans is a measure of exposure to 
credit risk and indicates adequate provisioning taking into account the banks’ previous 
                                                          
9 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. This group of countries was selected based on 
the availability of data.  
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performance and potential expected losses, higher value of NPL to gross loans reflects higher 
instability.; (2) Bank-credit-to-deposit ratio is an indicator of the amount of financial resources 
provided to the private sector by domestic commercial banks as a share of the total deposits in 
these banks, higher values indicate that banks are lending out more money than they are receiving 
in the form of deposits, thus indicates a higher liquidity risk and a less stable financial system. 
Variables (1) and (2) will be used in the computation of an index for financial instability (FSTX). 
In our analysis, we will regress the model three times, each against FSTX, NPL and CR2DP 
separately as robustness check.  
For Financial inclusion, we use 4 key variables to estimate the level of financial inclusion, all 
were retrieved from GFDD and IMF (FAS & IFS), employed by Neaime, S., & Gaysset, I. (2017); 
Kim, D. W., et al. (2018); Sharma, D. (2016).  We start with variables representing the availability 
of financial services like (1) Number of ATM’s per 100,000 adults as a proxy for the availability 
of banks and bank branches. Then we used variables indicating the penetration of financial services 
like (2) Depositors with commercial banks (per 1,000 adults)10 indicating the ability of economic 
agents to open and sustain a bank account. Finally, we use variables representing the usage of 
financial services like (3) domestic credit by financial sector to GDP (%); (4) Financial system 
deposits to GDP (%) both representing the usage of financial services employed by Morgan, P.J., 
et al. (2014); Berdiev, A. N., et al. (2016); and Sarma, M. (2008). 
For Shadow Economy Size, we employ a data set developed by Schneider, F., et al. (2018) that 
measures the size and the development of shadow economies. Using Multiple Indicators, Multiple 
Causes (MIMIC) approach, they estimated the size of SE in 158 countries from 1999-2015. This 
                                                          
10 Data directly representing bank account ownership by WB is limited to 2011 only.  
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is the single most recent data set that measure the size of SE for a complete time-period for 158 
countries. The MIMIC method is a theory-based approach that explicitly takes into account several 
exogenous causal variables and their effects on the SE, were it utilizes the relation between the 
observable causes and their effects on the unobservable variable (i.e.SE) to estimate the variable 
itself. The model is estimated by measuring the extent of which tax and regulatory burdens, 
currency/cash outside banks, unemployment rates, self-employment rates, economic freedom and 
business freedom affect the development of informal economy.   
Several control variables will be used in running our regression and can be divided into bank-
level data and country-level data. The country-level data will be extracted from the World 
Development Indicators and following previous studies conducted by Neaime, S., & Gaysset, I. 
(2017); Kim, D. W., et al. (2018); Sharma, D. (2016); Morgan, P.J., et al. (2014); Čihák, M., et al. 
(2016); Sahay, R., et al. (2015); Kasman, S., & Kasman, A. (2015); and Siddik, N. A. et al.  (2018). 
We utilize the following throughout our analysis: (1) GINI index; (2) logarithm of GDP per capita; 
(3) Unemployment rates; (4) Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population); (5) Gross 
enrolment ratio, secondary, both sexes (%); (6) Credit to government and state-owned enterprises 
to GDP (%) as an indicator for the crowding out of private sector; (7) Trade openness as (% of 
GDP); (8) Broad money to GDP as a proxy for the size of the financial system and inflation; (9) 
Financial openness index (0-1) developed by Chinn, M.D. and Hiro, I (2006).  
The bank-level data will be extracted from GFDD and following previous studies conducted by 
Sarma, M., & Pais, J. (2011); Kasman, S., & Kasman, A. (2015); and Pham, T., (2017), we will use 
(10) Boone indicator as a measure for the level of competition in the banking sector; (11) 5-bank 
asset concentration as a measure for bank concentration; and (12) Bank overhead costs to total 
assets (%) as a measure for banking inefficiency. 
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3.2 Measuring Financial Inclusion 
 
According to Sarma, M. (2008) definition of financial inclusion “it is a process that ensures the 
ease of access, availability and usage of formal financial system for all members of an economy”.  
Although there are many variables that represent a measure of the level of financial inclusion in a 
country, however, each of those variables relate to a specific dimension of financial inclusion like, 
access, availability, usage, affordability and timeliness. According to the literature review, 
financial inclusion plays a crucial role in enhancing the level of financial development.  
Additionally, vulnerable members in the least developed economies report financial exclusion as 
a major obstacle for their wellbeing as they are not only excluded financially, but socially as well. 
Consequently, financial exclusion is a main problem in countries with less than developed 
financial systems, where the unavailability of data makes it even harder for scholars and policy 
makers to tackle it effectively, the thing that increases the severity of the problem. In fact, 
availability of complete and comprehensive data sets is a usual problem faced scholars who study 
financial inclusion, which makes many refute to measuring it using one or few of its dimensions. 
Accordingly, this thesis will follow Sarma, M. (2008) and the UNDP in measuring Human 
Development Index 11 to calculate a comprehensive multidimensional financial inclusion index for 
20 emerging economies. This methodology was utilized by other scholars to create an index for 
financial inclusion Gupte, R., et al. (2012); Sarma, M., & Pais, J. (2011); and Pham, T., et al. 
(2017). To start with, Sarma, M. (2008, 2012) used banking system inclusion as a proxy for 
financial system inclusion since banks are the main source of most of the basic financial services. 
Three dimensions for measuring the index will be utilized following Sarma, M. (2012), those 
                                                          
11 For more details about the computation of UNDP indices (HDI, GDI, and HPI) see UNDP Technical Note of 
HDR available on UNDP’s website.  
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dimensions are DP: Penetration of the banking system using depositors with commercial banks per 
1000 adults ; DA: Availability of banking Services using ATMs per 100,000 adults; and DU: Usage 
of banking services using private credit and banking system deposits per GDP12. The choice of 
variables was decided following Sarma, M. (2012) and according to the availability of data. Each 
of those dimensions will be measured in a separate independently according to the following 
equation that ensures the 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖 ≤ 1; 




where di is the dimension index (d) for the i
th dimension. Ai is the actual value of dimension i, mi 
is the minimum value of dimension i, and Mi is the maximum value of dimension i. Then the index 
of financial inclusion for country x will be measured by the normalized inverse Euclidean distance 
of di from its ideal point 
13 following the below formula; 
𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑋𝑖 = 1 −
√(1 − 𝑑1)2 + (1 − 𝑑2)2 + … . +(1 − 𝑑𝑛)2
√𝑛
 
where n is the number of dimensions used.  
3.3 Measuring Financial Stability 
 
Like financial inclusion, the concept of financial system stability is complicated and hard to 
measure. A stable financial system can be one characterized by the absence of excessive stress, 
crises or volatility. However, this limited definition might fail to reflect the positive contributions 
                                                          
12 For details about list of variables used in the computation of each dimension, see Annex 1 table 1.  
13 If n dimensions of financial inclusion are considered, then country x will be represented by point DX= (d1,d2, …, 
dn) on the n-dimensional Cartesian space, where point O= (0,0,…,0) represented the worst scenario, while point 
I=(1,1…,1) represents the best scenario for all dimensions. The normalization is done in order to ensure that all 
values are between 0 and 1, while the inverse distance is considered so that a higher value indicates higher level of 
financial inclusion.  
38 
 
of a stable and well-functioning financial system on the economy as a whole. Consequently, 
broader definitions of financial stability are emerging, where the González-Páramo, J. (2007) 
defined it as: 
“a condition in which the financial system-comprising financial intermediaries, markets and 
market infrastructure- is capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of financial 
imbalances, thereby mitigating the likelihood of disruption in the financial intermediation process 
which are severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of savings to profitable investment 
opportunities.” 
Therefore, for measuring the level of financial stability, this thesis will use two variables to 
compute our index for financial instability, those are NPL to gross loans (NPL) and Bank-credit-
to-deposit ratio (CR2DP). First, we use the computed index of financial system instability 
discussed below. Second, we use both variables NPL and CR2DP to run two regressions 
separately.  Therefore, our model will run three times using each measure individually as a 
robustness check.  
The methodology introduced by Sarma, M. (2008) and used in the computation of the financial 
inclusion index discussed above will be used in the computation of the financial instability index 
as well. Two dimensions for measuring the resilience of banks and their liquidity exposure will be 
used, dI: Leverage Risk; and dQ: Liquidity risk 
14. Each of those dimensions will be measured in a 
independently according to the following equation that ensures the 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖 ≤ 1; 




                                                          
14 For a detailed description about the variables used in each dimension see table 2 in Annex 1.  
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where di is the dimension index (d) for the i
th dimension. Ai is the actual value of dimension i, mi 
is the minimum value of dimension i, and Mi is the maximum value of dimension i.  
Then the index of financial stability for country x will be measured by the normalized inverse 
Euclidean distance of di from its ideal point 
15 following the below formula; 
𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋𝑖 = 1 −
√(1 − 𝑑1)2 + (1 − 𝑑2)2 + … . +(1 − 𝑑𝑛)2
√𝑛
 
where n is the number of dimensions used.  
3.4 Methodology 
 
The hypotheses development of this thesis proposes that there is a potential relation between the 
size of the SE in a country and the level of financial inclusion. Additionally, both variables might 
affect the level of financial system stability. We examine the impact of financial inclusion and the 
size of the SE on financial stability using a Two-Stage Linear Square regression (2SLS) with 
country fixed effects on data of 20 emerging economies from 2004-2014.  Since there is a 
possibility that the results of this analysis might be biased due to problems of endogeneity between 
financial inclusion and the size of the SE as previously discussed in the literature, we use an 
instrumental variable technique with two-step linear square regression following Aahmed, M. M., 
& Mallick, S. K. (2017). A 2SLS regression analysis is a statistical technique that is used in the 
analysis of structural equations. 2SLS is considered an extension to OLS and mainly used when 
                                                          
15 If n dimensions of financial inclusion are considered, then country x will be represented by point DX= (d1,d2, …, 
dn) on the n-dimensional Cartesian space, where point O= (0,0,…,0) represented the worst scenario, while point 
I=(1,1…,1) represents the best scenario for all dimensions. The normalization is done in order to ensure that all 
values are between 0 and 1, while the inverse distance is considered so that a higher value indicates higher level of 
financial inclusion.  
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the response variable’s error term is correlated with the explanatory variables error terms, 
moreover, it is of great use when there are feedback effects in the model.  
In OLS, there is a basic assumption that the error terms of the dependent and the independent 
variables are independent of each other, however, when this assumption is voided, problems of 
endogeneity and bias start to arise. The 2SLS aids in solving those problems through the projection 
of a fitted value of the dependent variable using an instrumental variable that corrects the 
dependent variable to its error term. Therefore, the projected predictor is then assumed to be 
independent of the error term and correlated to the problematic predictor where it extracts the 
exogenous component of financial inclusion, reducing concerns about endogeneity. 
With respect to the scope of this research, the following steps will be used. In the first stage (model 
1), a projected variable that substitutes the problematic causal variable is created through an 
instrument variable.  Through regressing our computed financial inclusion index and other control 
variables against the size of the SE. Through this regression, we create an instrumental variable 
that represents the residual series of the SE. Using this residual series as an instrumental variable 
will enable us to project a new fitted variable for the size of the SE.  
In the second stage (model 2), the new fitted variable will be regressed along with financial 
inclusion and other control variables against the degree of financial system instability. We run 
three regressions using the fitted value of SE, the financial inclusion index and other control 
variables including country-specific and banking-system-specific data against our computed index 
of financial instability, NPL ratio, and credit-to-deposit ratio separately. The estimation output of 
the three models using three different dependent variables individually will act as robustness test 
for one another.  
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3.5 Model  
 
In this section the two employed models and the hypothesis that each model will test are described. 
A brief description of the data used in each model will be given with the choice of the dependent 
and the independent variables.  
3.5.1 Model 1 
The size of the SE will be regressed against financial inclusion and other country level control 
variables for a sample of 20 emerging economies16  from 2004-2014, to estimate the validity 
hypothesis (01). The following hypothesis will be tested; 
H01: Financial Inclusion has a significant negative effect on the size of the SE. 
Using panel least squares regression on the following equation; 
𝑆𝐻𝐷𝑊𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑋𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3(𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝛽5(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽6(𝑆𝐶𝑁𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽7(𝐶𝑅𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where (𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑋𝑖,𝑡) is a composite index measuring the degree of financial inclusion
17, measure of 
income inequality (𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡), Logarithm of GDP per capita (𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶)𝑖,𝑡, Unemployment rates  
(𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) lagged by 1, Age dependency ratio as a percentage of working-age population 
(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡), Gross enrolment ratio in secondary schools for both sexes (𝑆𝐶𝑁𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡), Credit to 
government and state owned enterprises as a percentage of GDP (𝐶𝑅𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡),  and degree of trade 
openness (𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡). β are a set of nuisance parameters, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an error term; i = 1,…,N 
                                                          
16 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. This group of countries was selected based on 
the availability of data. 
17 For details about the computation of this index, see ch.3 
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represents the country; and t = 1,…,T represents time. Finally,  𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest to 
us, where it will measure the impact of financial inclusion on determining the size of the SE. 
3.5.2 Model 2 
The degree of financial instability was regressed against the level of financial inclusion and other 
bank-level and country-level control variables for a sample of 17 18 emerging economies from 
2004-2014, to estimate the validity of hypothesis (02), (03) and (04). The following hypotheses 
will be tested; 
H02: Financial inclusion has a significant negative effect on financial instability. 
H03: The size of the SE has a significant positive effect on financial instability. 
H04: Banking sector competition has a significant negative effect on financial instability.  
Using panel least squares regression on the following equation; 
𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑋𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2( 𝑌^𝑆𝐻𝐷𝑊𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3(𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑂𝑉𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽7(𝑀2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝐹𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where (𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋𝑖,𝑡) is a composite index measuring the degree of financial instability; where higher 
levels indicate higher financial instability (𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑋𝑖,𝑡) is a composite index measuring the degree of 
financial inclusion 19,  projected fitted values of the size of the SE obtained from model 1 
 ( 𝑌^𝑆𝐻𝐷𝑊𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡),  Boone Indicator as a measure of banking system competitiveness (𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡) 
where higher levels indicate a deterioration in the level of competitiveness of the financial system 
, assets of the five largest banks as a percentage of total assets of commercial banks as a measure 
of banking system concentration (𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡) where higher levels indicates higher concentration ,  
                                                          
18 Countries excluded due to unavailability of data for the variable covered in model 2 were India, Poland, and 
Turkey. 
19 For details about the computation of the indices, see ch.3 
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bank overhead costs (𝑂𝑉𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡) where higher levels indicate lower efficiency,  Logarithm of GDP 
per capita (𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶)𝑖,𝑡, broad money to GDP (𝑀2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) as a measure of financial liberalization, 
and degree of financial openness (0-1) 𝐹𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑖,𝑡 as a measure of capital account financial 
integration. β are a set of nuisance parameters, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an error term; i = 1,…,N represents the 
country; and t = 1,…,T represents time. As previously mentioned, we utilize NPL to gross loans 
(NPL) and Banks credit-to-deposit ration (CR2DP) along with our computed index (FSTX) to run 
three separate regressions as robustness check.  
3.6 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Tables 1 and 2 below reports the descriptive statistics and the correlations of the variables used in 
the empirical analysis that follows. The table is divided accordingly, the first variable reflects the 
size of the SE. While the second section represents financial inclusion measures; that include the 
index computed (FNCX), and the dimensions used in measuring the index; i.e. number of deposit 
account holders, ATMs and private credit & deposits to GDP. In the third section, we have 
financial instability measures that include the index computed (FSTX) and its dimensions i.e. bank 
credit to deposits and bank NPL to gross loans. The fourth section include variables related to the 
banking system of a country like the Boone indication, 5 bank asset concentration, and Banks 
overhead costs. The fifth section include country-related variables like the GINI coefficient, GDP 
per capita, unemployment rates, age dependency ratio, secondary school enrollment, credit to 
government and state-owned enterprises, level of trade openness, broad money to GDP and the 
level of financial openness. One important note on table 1 is that the number of observations varies 
according to the regression model each belongs to. Since this thesis will run 2 separate regression 













Descriptive Statistics (2004-2015) 
 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum St.Dev. No.of Obs 
       
SHDWEC 30.40393 29.99500 54.68000 1.670000 10.62962 112 
Financial Inclusion Variables 
 FNCX 0.505897 0.492116 0.826306 0.355552 0.115214 112 
 Number of Deposit account holders (per 1,000) 940.3912 861.1600 4522.180 8.090000 826.4177 112 
 Automated teller machines (ATMs) (per 100,000) 55.49968  43.07325 265.3754  0.750167  50.25925 112 
 Sum of private credit and deposits to GDP 95.50723 81.78500 245.8300 25.17000 57.91919 112 
Financial Instability Variables 
 FSTX 0.153570 0.144519 0.443858 0.059401 0.068522 98 
 CR2DP (%) 100.7331 86.87690 279.7639 45.25945 47.07230 98 
 NPL (%) 4.784831 3.063505 37.30000 0.588001 5.160662 98 
Banking System Variables 
 BOON -0.079714 -0.080460 0.543273 -3.196120 0.363597 98 
 BCONC 69.02382 65.68865 100.0000 43.23730 13.68022 98 
 OVHC 3.425652 2.969910 10.03910 0.927641 1.679368 98 
Country-level Variables 
GINI 42.93777 41.80000 66.10000 29.80000 8.461427 112 
LGDPC 8.798278 8.939911 10.04589 6.476672 0.769155 112 
UNEMP 7.210598 7.405000 24.69000 0.490000 4.442334 112 
AGEDP 51.23556 51.58416 87.85667 35.59041 10.05246 112 
SCNROL 88.00463 93.37472 106.9244 25.21502 17.34480 112 
CRGOV 13.87945 11.66725 41.33550 0.703272 10.10449 112 
TROPEN 62.27086 50.12832 171.5659 22.10595 36.31737 112 
M2GDP 63.73418 52.49989 185.8942 21.02095 38.18516 98 
FNOPEN 0.392588 0.414513 1.000000 0.000000 0.280592 98 
Source: Author’s calculations       
 The table below shows the correlation matrix of all the variables used in our regression. 
 
 
Table (2)   
Correlation Matrix 
Corr. SHDWEC  FNCX  FSTX  BOON  BCONC  OVHC  GINI  LGDPC  UNEMP  AGDEP  SCROL  CRGOV  TROPEN  M2GDP  FINOPN  
SHDWEC  1.0000               
FNCX  0.0267 1.0000              
FSTX  -0.1291 0.1897 1.0000             
BOON  -0.2375 0.1070 -0.4121 1.0000            
BCONC  0.1712 0.0505 0.2409 -0.0852 1.0000           
OVHC  0.2307 -0.4909 -0.2685 -0.4819 -0.0843 1.0000          
GINI  0.0474 0.0633 -0.1373 -0.0918 0.2107 0.1135 1.0000         
LGDPC  -0.3751 0.2831 -0.2093 0.2171 -0.3216 0.0426 0.1655 1.0000        
UNEMP  -0.4038 -0.0433 -0.0411 -0.0159 0.1904 0.0968 0.6224 0.2051 1.0000       
AGDEP  0.2458 -0.6714 -0.0661 -0.4188 0.2356 0.5609 -0.0099 -0.6003 0.1192 1.0000      
SCROL  -0.2812 0.1821 -0.2047 0.2333 -0.2345 0.0007 0.4279 0.7689 0.2922 -0.6038 1.0000     
CRGOV  0.0271 0.2032 -0.0835 -0.0204 -0.1229 -0.0345 0.0781 0.0606 0.0433 -0.1537 0.1059 1.0000    
TROPEN  0.1557 0.6216 0.1839 0.0903 -0.0630 -0.2062 -0.3772 0.1522 -0.2695 -0.3927 0.0242 -0.1614 1.0000   
M2GDP  -0.2214 0.7313 0.3634 0.1466 -0.0534 -0.6297 -0.2378 0.1117 -0.2721 -0.6809 0.0383 0.1847 0.4034 1.0000  
FINOPN  0.1914 -0.1400 0.0945 0.0258 0.3536 0.0977 0.1191 0.0401 -0.0734 -0.0329 0.2922 -0.0474 0.1646 -0.1923 1.0000 







4.1  Results of Model One 
 
The regression output of model 1 is represented in table (3) below. Financial inclusion in a country 
as measured by out computed index (𝐹𝑁𝑋𝐶) had no significant effect on the size of the SE, 
therefore accepting our null hypothesis that financial inclusion does not affect the size of the SE. 
This finding opposed that of Berdiev, A. N., & Saunoris, J. W. (2016) which can be attributed to 
their usage of a larger data set with a more inclusive measure for financial inclusion. 
 In terms of the control variables, we obtained the following results. Inequality as measured by 
(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡) had a significant positive effect, that is, the higher the inequality in a certain country the 
larger the size of the SE. Income levels as measured by log GDP per capita (𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶) had a 
significant negative effect on SE, where higher income levels make people less prone to refute to 
the informal sector for their economic activities.  
Lagged values of unemployment rates (𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃) were found to have a significant negative 
relation with SE, where higher levels of unemployment reduce the size of the SE, which can be 
explained that the unemployed voluntary choose to remain unemployed whether in the formal or 
the informal sector. Moreover, being unemployed by itself means that the person is still seeking a 
job in the formal sector and didn’t yet enter the informal sector for living.  
The ratio of the financially dependent people to the working age population as measured by the 
age dependency ratio  (𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐷𝑃) had a significant positive effect of SE. The higher the ratio of 
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people who are economically dependent on certain economic agents for living, the higher the 
probability of those agents to refute to the informal economy to meet their own and the dependents 
needs. In other words, the productive population seeks working full time or part time jobs in the 
informal sector to be able to maintain the upbringing and the pensions of the economically 
dependent members. The ratio of people enrolled in secondary education as measured by Gross 
secondary enrollment ratio (𝑆𝐶𝑁𝑅𝑂𝐿), is a significant determinant of SE size. Besides the fact 
that higher school enrollment means lower child labor and thus smaller participation in the SE, 
higher school enrollment can reflect the fact that potential labor will be better qualified for basic 
market needs and better able to distinguish the adverse effects of participating in an informal 
economic activity.  It was found that the higher levels of secondary school enrollment significantly 
decreased the size of the SE.  
In order to measure the crowding out effect of lending to the public sector, credit to government 
and state-owned enterprises as a percentage of GDP (𝐶𝑅𝐺𝑂𝑉) was found to have a significant 
positive effect with the size of the SE. Increased lending to government enterprises means less 
available funds for the private sector; households and firms, which contributes to them being 
crowded out. The private sector can then refute to external sources, or sometimes to the informal 
economy for funds, thus increasing the size of the SE. The level of international trade exposure as 
measured by percentage of total trade over GDP (𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) was found to have a significant 
negative effect on the size of the SE, which can be attributed to the fact that trade openness creates 























Dependent Variable: SHDWEC 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.972311 
(1) Parenthesis imply St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10,5 ,1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝑆𝐻𝐷𝑊𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑋𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽2(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽4(𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝛽5(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽6(𝑆𝐶𝑁𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡)





4.2  Results of Model Two 
 
The regression output of model 2 is shown in table (4) where the level of financial inclusion, size 
of SE and other control variables were regressed against measures of financial instability; 
including our computed index of financial instability, and the two variables used in the 
computation of this index separately (NPL to gross loans and Bank Credit to Deposit).  Column 
(1) and (3) show that the level of financial inclusion in a country  (𝐹𝑁𝑋𝐶) has a significant positive 
effect on the level of financial system instability; (𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋)   and (𝐶𝑅2𝐷𝑃) , therefore rejecting our 
null hypothesis that financial inclusion does not affect the size of the SE. Higher financial inclusion 
can lead to a more instable financial system when the credit expansion is unregulated. This finding 
is in line with that of Norris, E. D., et al. (2015), Sahay, R., et al. (2015) and Čihák, M., et al. 
(2016).  
Additionally, the projected fitted values of the size of the SE obtained from model 1 
(𝑌^𝑆𝐻𝐷𝑊𝐸𝐶) was found to have a significant positive relation to financial instability (𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋), 
that is, the larger the size of the SE, the more unstable the financial system becomes. This finding 
conforms with that of Rahman, A. (2014).  
 In terms of the bank-level conditioning variables, we obtained the following results represented 
in columns (1) and (2). The level of bank competitiveness as measured by the Boone indicator 
(𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑁) was found to have a significant negative relation with financial instability (𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋) and 
(𝑁𝑃𝐿) . An increase in BOON indicates a lower competitive environment, therefore, the lower the 
competition in the banking sector, the more stable the financial system is.  Therefore, we can reject 
our null hypothesis that competition has no effect on financial system instability.  On the other 
hand, while using the assets of the five largest banks to total commercial banks as a measure for 
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banking system concentration (𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶), a significant positive relation with level of financial 
instability  (𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋) and (𝑁𝑃𝐿) was found. This indicates that the higher the degree of banking 
concentration the less stable the financial system is, those findings conform with Kasman, S. & 
Kasman A. (2015) and Ben Ali, M. S., et al. (2018).  
The level of banking system efficiency as measured by the operating expenses of the banking 
system as a percentage of total assets held through bank overhead costs (𝑂𝑉𝐻𝐶) was found to 
have a significant negative relation with the level of instability (𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋). 
Income levels as measured by log GDP per capita(𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶) depicted a significant positive effect 
on financial instability (𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋) and (𝐶𝑅2𝐷𝑃), therefore, the higher households income levels in a 
country, the less stable the financial system is. This can be explained through the notion that higher 
GDP per capita, doesn’t necessarily mean that all members of an economy will have higher 
incomes. In fact, this increase in income can be concentrated in the hands of a few, where extreme 
concentrations of wealth can be a cause of financial instability in line with Beck, T. et al. (2007). 
Opposite results where obtained when regressing against (𝑁𝑃𝐿) as a measure of financial 
instability, where (𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶) was found to have a significant negative relationship with the level of 
instability (non-performing loans to gross loans).  
The amount of money supply and a proxy of size of the financial sector as measured by broad 
money to GDP (𝑀2𝐺𝐷𝑃) was found to have a significant negative effect on financial instability 
(𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋) and (𝐶𝑅2𝐷𝑃), where the bigger the amount of money supply, the bigger the size of the 
financial sector, and thus the more stable it becomes. The degree of capital account exposure to 
the international markets as a proxy for financial openness (𝐹𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑁) was found to have a 
significant positive relation with the level of financial instability (𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋) and (𝐶𝑅2𝐺𝐷𝑃). The 
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higher financial exposure to international financial and capital markets can make an economy more 




Table (4) Dependent Variable 
 Measures of Financial Instability 










































































    Observations 98 104 98 
R-squared 0.929944 0.895554 0.964365 
Adjusted R-squared 0.902922 0.858448 0.950620 
(1) Parenthesis imply St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10,5 ,1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑋𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2( 𝑌^𝑆𝐻𝐷𝑊𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3(𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑂𝑉𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽7(𝑀2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝐹𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where the dependent variables used were FSTX, NPL & Credit-to-Deposit alternatively. 






This thesis aims to analyze the relation between the level of financial inclusion, financial system 
stability and the size of the Shadow Economy (SE). In order to do so, our review of related 
literature has compiled a sound theoretical framework describing the channels by which this 
complex relationship works. First, under a strong regulatory and supervisory legal framework, 
financial inclusion was argued to decrease the size of the SE through many channels. For instance, 
higher financial inclusion was stated to decrease intermediation costs, increase the social 
legitimacy of financial institutions, and enhance various socioeconomic variables that affects long 
run economic stability, like equality, fair distribution of resources and income levels.  
Second, a framework about the main factors that affect financial stability was presented. For 
instance, financial inclusion was said to impact the stability of the financial system through the 
offering a more diversified deposit and loan bases, higher efficiency of financial institutions, more 
stable household financial position and more effective monetary policy. The level of banking 
concentration and competition can also affect the level of financial stability, through creating 
pressures on banks’ profits, thus creating an incentive for the banks to alter their risk-taking 
behavior and interest rates. The level of concentration of the banking sector can also alter the 
government’s regulatory burden and quality of supervision, consequently affecting the stability of 
the financial sector.  Moreover, financial stability can be affected by the size of the SE since credit 
and saving channels provided by the informal sector can significantly impede stability.  
In order to understand the interrelationship between financial inclusion, SE, financial stability, this 
thesis has employed panel data for 20 emerging economies over the period 2004-2014. Our 
53 
 
methodology depends on panel fixed effects Two-Stage Linear Regression (2SLS), that aims to 
cure the endogeneity problem between financial inclusion and the size of the SE in assessing their 
effects on financial stability, through the creation of a fitted value of SE using an instrumental 
variable. Our empirical methodology is based on regressing two models, one assesses the relation 
between inclusion and SE and the other assesses the relation between inclusion, SE and financial 
stability. After regressing the first model, we found that financial inclusion had no significant 
effect on the size of the SE. Moreover, income inequality, age dependency ratio and credit to 
government and state-owned enterprises were found to significantly increase the size of the SE. 
On the other hand, income levels, unemployment, secondary school enrollment rates and level of 
trade openness were found to significantly impede the size of the SE.  
In our second model, we assessed the relation between financial stability, financial inclusion, the 
size of the SE and banking system competition, while controlling for bank-specific and country 
specific variables. Higher levels of financial inclusion, level of competition of the banking sector, 
levels of concentration of the banking system, degree of financial openness, and bigger size of SE,  
were found to lower the degree of financial stability. On the other hand, banking system 
inefficiency as measured by bank overhead costs to total assets, and broad money to GDP were 
found to significantly increase the financial system stability.  
The findings of this thesis can have important policy implications since the inclusion-stability and 
SE- stability tradeoffs were found to be significant. The relations concluded in this thesis can 
highlight important factors for policy makers and governmental agencies to focus their efforts. 
Increasing financial accessibility of poor and more vulnerable economic agents, and thus driving 
them away from the informal sector and its adverse effects can pave the road for reaching a more 
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Data used in computing financial inclusion index FNCX.  
 Dimension Description Source 
DP Penetration  




Automated teller machines (ATMs) 
(per 100,000 adults) 
GFDD 
DU* Usage 
Private credit by deposit money 
banks to GDP (%) 
GFDD 
Financial system deposits to GDP 
(%) 
GFDD 
*Du was calculated; following Sarma, M. (2012), as the sum of Private credit by deposit money 
banks to GDP and Financial system deposits to GDP, then converting the result into a dimension 
whose values are between 0 and 1. 
-The dimensions above were given the following weights 0.5,0.5,1 respectively. This was done 
due to the limited availability of data DA and Dp in a number of observations.  
 
Table 1B  








-The dimensions above were given the following weights; 1,1 respectively.  
 Dimension Description Source 
DI Leverage risk 
Bank nonperforming loans to 
gross loans (%) GFDD 
DQ Liquidity risk  Bank credit to bank deposit (%) GFDD 




The table below presents all the variables used in this thesis, along with their description and sources.  
Data sources 
 




Using MIMIC model, a data set of the size of shadow economy in 158 countries from 1999-2015 was estimated, 
through measuring the extent of which tax burden, regulatory burden, currency/cash outside banks, unemployment 
rates, self-employment rates, economic freedom and business freedom affect the development of informal 
economy. 
Schneider, F., & 
Medina, L. (2018) 








Denotes the total number of deposit account holders that are resident nonfinancial corporations (public and private) 
and households in commercial banks for every 1,000 adults in the reporting country. Calculated as: (number of 








Automated teller machines are computerized telecommunications devices that provide clients of a financial 
institution with access to financial transactions in a public place.  
IMF-FAS 
 
Private credit to 
GDP  
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks to GDP 
(%) 
The financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP. Domestic 







deposits to GDP 
(%) 
Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share of GDP. GFDD 
Financial Instability Variables 
 CR2DP (%) 
Bank credit to 
bank deposit (%) 
The financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of total deposits. 
Domestic money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept transferable 
deposits, such as demand deposits. Total deposits include demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks. 
GFDD 
 NPL (%) 
Bank 
nonperforming 
loans to gross 
loans (%) 
Ratio of defaulting loans (payments of interest and principal past due by 90 days or more) to total gross loans (total 
value of loan portfolio). The loan amount recorded as nonperforming includes the gross value of the loan as 




Banking System Variables 
 BOON Boone indicator 
A measure of degree of competition based on profit-efficiency in the banking market. It is calculated as the elasticity 
of profits to marginal costs. An increase in the Boone indicator implies a deterioration of the competitive conduct 
of financial intermediaries. A measure of degree of competition, calculated as the elasticity of profits to marginal 
costs. To obtain the elasticity, the log of profits (measured by return on assets) is regressed on the log of marginal 
costs. The estimated coefficient (computed from the first derivative of a trans-log cost function) is the elasticity. 
The rationale behind the indicator is that higher profits are achieved by more-efficient banks. Hence, the more 





Assets of five largest banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. Total assets include total earning assets, 
cash and due from banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, goodwill, other intangibles, current tax assets, deferred 
tax, discontinued operations and other assets. 
Bankscope and Orbis 
Bank Focus, Bureau 
van Dijk (BvD) 
OVHC 
Bank overhead 
costs to total 
assets (%) 
Operating expenses of a bank as a share of the value of all assets held. Total assets include total earning assets, cash 
and due from banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, goodwill, other intangibles, current tax assets, deferred tax 
assets, discontinued operations and other assets. 
Bankscope and Orbis 
Bank Focus, Bureau 
van Dijk (BvD) 
Country-level Variables 
GINI 
GINI index of 
income 
inequality 
Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) 
among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve 
plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with 
the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical 
line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 
represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
WB and WIID 
LGDPC 
Logarithm of 
GDP per capita 
(current US$) 
 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 




Rates, total (%) 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. 




ratio (% of 
working-age 
population) 
Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or older than 64--to the working-age 





both sexes (%) 
Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Secondary education completes the provision of basic 
education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human 











Ratio between credit by domestic money banks to the government and state-owned enterprises and GDP. IMF- IFS 
TROPEN 
Trade openess as 
(% of GDP) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. WB 
M2GDP 
Broad money to 
GDP 
Broad money (IFS line 35L..ZK) is the sum of currency outside banks; demand deposits other than those of the 
central government; the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central 







The Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) is an index measuring a country's degree of capital account openness KAOPEN 
is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial 
transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER). 
Retrieved from 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/
Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
